A Twisted Mosaic: The Ninth Circuit\u27s Piecemeal Approval of Environmental Crime in \u3ci\u3eKasza v. Browner\u3c/i\u3e by Vibbert, Shannon
Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law 
Volume 17 
Issue 1 Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law, Volume 17, Issue 1 
Article 7 
January 2002 
A Twisted Mosaic: The Ninth Circuit's Piecemeal Approval of 
Environmental Crime in Kasza v. Browner 
Shannon Vibbert 
University of Kentucky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Vibbert, Shannon (2002) "A Twisted Mosaic: The Ninth Circuit's Piecemeal Approval of Environmental 
Crime in Kasza v. Browner," Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law: Vol. 17 : Iss. 1 , Article 7. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol17/iss1/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 
A TWISTED MOSAIC: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S PIECEMEAL




In 1995, President Clinton stated that as a nation, "[o]ur
greatness is measured not only in how we so frequently do right, but
also how we act when we have done the wrong thing, how we
confront our mistakes, make our apologies, and take action."' While
this rhetoric may be inspiring, the results of Kasza v. Browner2 and
Frost v. Perry3 indicate that the standards used to measure the
criminal actions of the United States government fall short of
greatness. These standards, supposedly in the interest of national
security, create a mosaic of logic that skews the scales of justice away
from finding government accountability and towards condoning
criminal activity.
The Kasza and Frost cases concerned attempts by plaintiffs
"to compel compliance with hazardous waste inventory, inspection,
and disclosure responsibilities. ' 4 Both cases culminated in appeals to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 5 The two
cases, consolidated on appeal, employed different methods of attack.6
However, both failed after running headlong into the state secrets
privilege and an executive order exempting the Air Force from
complying with Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
requirements.7 It is also important to note that these cases are not
only on behalf of named plaintiffs but that they are also joined by an
unnamed number of "John Doe" plaintiffs who cannot publicly admit
to working at the Air Force base in question since they would be in
* Production Editor, Journal of Natural Resources and Environmental Law. J.D.
Expected, University of Kentucky, May 2003.
'Press release, George Washington University, Office of University Relations
(October 12, 1995). Released in conjunction with compensation for victims of prior military
casualties in radiation experiments and production.2Kasza v. Browner, 902 F. Supp. 1240 (D. Nev. 1995).3Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434 (D. Nev. 1995).
4Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1162 (9th Cir. 1998).
'See id.6See id.7Presidential Determination No. 95-45, 60 Fed. Reg. 52, 823 (Oct. 10, 1995).
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violation of an employment secrecy oath, punishable by a ten-year
prison sentence.8 This level of secrecy also led to the sealing of an
office belonging to Jonathan Turley, the attorney for both plaintiffs;
"[the] office remains sealed by federal court order-students and
others are not allowed to enter because the government says Turley's
files hold documents that are classified." 9 In Kasza, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that this was not an
"abuse of the [state secrets] privilege."' 0
The Frost case developed as the widow of Robert Frost
attempted to gather information regarding which substances her
husband had been exposed to during his employment at the Air Force
base. Frost died in 1989 of cirrhosis of the liver."' Examination of
his fatty tissue revealed "unusually high levels of dioxins and other
carcinogens"' 2 and "high amounts of dioxin and dibenzofurans,
plastic- and solvent[-]based chemicals taken into the body via smoke
inhalation."' 3  While the liver ailment was not the sole cause of
Frost's death, a biochemist stated that "exposure to the chemicals
could have accelerated its progress, resulting in premature death."' 4
Frost and the additional unnamed plaintiffs initiated a citizen suit
alleging violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
of 1976 ("RCRA").'5 Frost's widow did not seek monetary damages,
but rather sought "a declaration that the Air Force failed to perform
duties required by RCRA, injunctive relief to restrain the Air Force
from incinerating and transporting hazardous wastes in the vicinity of
the operating location, civil penalties, and attorney's fees."' 6
The Kasza action was initiated against the EPA based upon a
violation of RCRA requirements."' Both Kasza and Frost suffered
from a variety of illnesses "that took the form of constant respiratory
distress and a painful skin condition" commonly referred to by
workers as "fish scales.' 8  Both alleged that their illnesses could be
attributed to a policy of waste removal that could only be labeled as
crude, at best:
860 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, March 17, 1996).
9
Richard Leiby, Secrets Under the Sun, THE WASHINGTON POST, July 20, 1997, at
Fl.
'0Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170 n.9.
"Margaret A. Jacobs, A Secret Air Base Hazardous Waste Act, Workers' Suit
Alleges, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 1996, at Al.
"Id. at Al.
3
Jason Vest, Alien Toxins, 44 VILLAGE VOICE 45, 45 (Nov. 16, 1999).
"Jacobs, supra note 1I, at At.
"42 U.S.C. § 6972 (1976).
"Kaza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1998).
"Kasza v. Browner, 902 F. Supp. 1240, 1240 (D. Nev. 1995).
'8Vest, supra note 13, at 45.
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... [C]lassified materials were burned at least once
a week in 100-yard-long, 25-foot-wide pits. With
security guards standing at the edge, Air Force
personnel threw in hazardous chemicals such as
methylethylketone... computers... drums of
hazardous materials trucked in from defense
facilities in other states... ignited [them] with jet
fuel and typically burned [them] for eight to 12
hours. 19
Kasza's widow sought a "declaration that [the] EPA has
failed to perform acts and duties required by RCRA, ...an injunction
prohibiting it from violating RCRA's mandatory requirements[,]
...and costs of litigation."
20
In Frost, the United States District Court for the District of
Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of the Air Force,
"[flinding that the state secrets privilege invoked by the Secretary of
the Air Force made discovery and trial impossible[.],, 21 This was true
because "the Air Force refused to furnish almost all the information
requested," and after invoking the state secrets privilege, it supported
these denials with classified and unclassified declarations available
only to the court for in camera review. 22 Subsequently, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of summary judgment.23
The same district court also dismissed Kasza "as moot, since
inventory and inspection activities were carried out after the action
was filed. 24  In addition, the President exempted the operating
location near Groom Lake "from any hazardous waste provision that
would require disclosure of classified information to any
unauthorized person[s]."25  The court did not grant summary
judgment to the EPA, however, on the claim that it violated the
public disclosure requirements of the RCRA.26 The court reasoned
that the Act "itself provides no exception for disclosure of classified
information," but does allow for Presidential exemption of filing such
reports.27 After allowing time for the EPA to obtain such a grant, the
court denied injunctive relief to Kasza. 28 The United States Court of
"9Jacobs, supra note 11, at Al.
20
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district
court, although it remanded for reconsideration the award of
plaintiff's fees and the rationale for a sealing order.29
Upon appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit, the Frost and Kasza cases were consolidated, although
the parties continued their litigation along different routes.30  The
points of interest in Frost's appeal for purposes of this article are
threefold. First, "Frost argue[d] that the entire regulatory subject
matter of a RCRA enforcement action [could not] be a state secret."
31
Frost's second claim was that the state secrets privilege "was
overbroad and could not properly bar all material discovery."
32
Finally, Frost maintained that the Secretary of the Air Force did not
properly review all of the material necessary to validate the use of the
state secrets privilege.
33
Kasza's appeal contained three central issues as well. 34 First,
Kasza argued that the validity of the EPA's "piggy-backing" on the
Air Force's use of the state secrets privilege should be reviewed.35
Second, Kasza disagreed with "the district court's permitting [the]
EPA to rely on privileged information... [while] denying her access to
the material. 36  Lastly, Kasza questioned the validity of the
Presidential exemption. 37 While the court dealt with the issues on
appeal individually, it seems most beneficial to look to the broad
strokes of the court's action as applied to both cases. Essentially, the
court allowed the Government to use the state secrets privilege to
prevent a vigorous review of the Air Force's mosaic theory, and then
bolstered that action by validating the retroactive Presidential
exemption.
II. THE STATE SECRETS PRIVILEGE
The Frost and Kasza appeals failed for reasons related, at
least in part, to the state secrets privilege. "The state secrets privilege
is a common law evidentiary privilee that allows the government to
deny discovery of military secrets."38 This privilege is a relative of
the Totten39 doctrine-a two-pronged theory which originally "stood
"9d. at 1175-76.
30





Kasza, 113 F.3d at 1165.33See id.





38Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165.
39Totten Adm'r v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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for the proposition that the courts of the United States lacked
jurisdiction to hear complaints against the United States brought by
parties who alleged that they entered into contracts for secret services
with the national government.' '4 It is the second prong of the Totten
doctrine that seemingly gave rise to part of the state secrets privilege:
It may be stated as a general principle, that public
policy forbids the maintenance of any suit in a court
of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead to
the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards
as confidential, and respecting which it will not al
low the confidence to be violated.
The United States Supreme Court espoused the proper use of the
fully developed state secrets privilege in United States v. Reynolds:42
The privilege belongs to the Government and must
be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly
invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has
control over the matter, after actual consideration by
that officer. The court itself must determine whether
the circumstances are appropriate for the claim of
privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure
of the very thing the privilege is designed to
protect.43
Once these criteria are met and the court has determined that there
was "a reasonable possibility that military secrets were involved,""
then "the claim of privilege will be accepted without requiring further
disclosure."
45
There are few limitations to this privilege, but those that do
exist are crucial to the Kasza case. The term "'state secrets' is
amorphous in nature, it should be defined in light of 'reason and
experience,'..., i.e. a 'generic concept of broad connotations,
referring to the military and naval establishments and the related
"Sean C. Flynn, The Totten Doctrine and its Poisoned Progeny, 25 VT. L. REv. 793
(2001). 4t
Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
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,46
activities of national preparedness'." Because of the elusive and
often changing nature of what actually constitutes a state secret,
courts have typically given broad discretion in allowing such an
assertioi. 47 One such formulation of that discretion is that:
[T]he trial judge should insist (1) that the formal
claim of privilege be made on public record and (2)
that the government either (a) publicly explain in
detail the kinds of injury to national security it seeks
to avoid and the reason those harms would result
from revelation of the requested information, or (b)
indicate why such an explanation would itself
endanger national security.48
However, "whenever possible, sensitive information must be
disentangled from non-sensitive information to allow for the release
of the latter., 49  This "disentangling" may be accomplished by in
camera review of materials submitted by the party invoking the
privilege, and then the final determination will rest with the court's
review of those materials.50
Three possible effects may result upon a finding that the state
secret privilege is properly invoked. First, the evidence may be
completely removed from the case and the case will go forward
without that evidence. 5' If the plaintiff cannot establish the prima
facie elements of the claim, then the case may be dismissed.
5 2
Second, "if the privilege deprives the defendant of information that
would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim,"
then summary judgment may be granted to the defendant.5 3 The final
effect may occur when the subject matter of the case itself involves a
state secret.54 In that instance the action should be dismissed "solely
on the invocation of the state secrets privilege."
55
Obviously, the results of properly invoking the privilege are
harsh and could be dispositive of any claim. This result is
rationalized by the fact that "the results are harsh in either direction
46Jabara v. Kelley, 75 F.R.D. 475, 483 n.25 (E.D. Mich. 1977) (citations omitted).47
ld.
4
'EIlsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 63-64 (D.C. Cir, 1983).49
1d. at 57.5 See generally Id.; Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1998).
"Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; see also United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 11
(1953).
" Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166.
53
1d.
"Id.; see also Reynolds, 345 U.S. at l1; Totten Adm'r v. United States, 92 U.S. 105,
107 (1875).
55Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1166; see also Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11; Totten, 92 U.S. at 107.
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and the state secret doctrine finds the greater public good-ultimately
the less harsh remedy-to be dismissal. ' 6  Whether or not the
"greater good" takes into account the long-term effects of
environmental damage, much less the effects of human damage, is an
issue yet to be discussed.
III. THE MOSAIC THEORY
The mosaic theory is not a judicial creation, but rather an
explanation that the government typically offers as the basis for
invocation of the state secrets privilege, This theory is an explanation
"that the business of foreign intelligence gathering in this age of
computer technology is more akin to the construction of a mosaic
than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger affair."57 The
basis of the theory is that by compiling bits and pieces of data
concerning a given subject, foreign intelligence would be able to
piece together information as to how the whole subject operates.58
As the theory works, "if seemingly innocuous information is
part of a classified mosaic, the state secrets privilege may be invoked
to bar its disclosure and the court cannot order the government to
disentangle the information from other classified information." 59
According to Air Force Secretary Sheila Widnall, "[C]ollection of
information regarding the air, water and soil is a classic foreign
intelligence practice... because analysis of these samples can result in
the identification of military operations and capabilities. '60 It is this
reasoning that prevents the admission of any evidence by the
plaintiffs and "puts the government in the Orwellian position of
trying to keep secret a 40,000-acre complex where airplanes and
buses full of workers arrive every day.
61
IV. PRESIDENTIAL EXEMPTION
The RCRA allows for presidential exemptions for "any solid
waste management facility of any department, agency, or
instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance.., if he
determines it to be in the paramount interest of the United States to
do So." ' 62 The only statutory limitation on this power arises when
such an exemption is due to a lack of appropriation of funds when the
5
6Bareford v. Gen. Dynamics Group, 973 F.2d 1138, 1144 (5th Cir. 1992).
57Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
581d.
59
Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165.
"Lciby, supra note 9, at F1.
6
"id. at FI.
1242 U.S.C. § 6961 (2001).
2002-20031
J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
President has not made a request for such funds.63 While the
President has the power to provide such an exemption under the
RCRA, such power is in conflict with case law relating to presidential
orders since executive orders cannot be used to protect evidence of
criminal activity.
64
In arriving at a judgment in the Frost and Kasza appeals, the
court did not discuss concealment of environmental crime. There is,
however, some discussion of whether the state secrets privilege and
the RCRA exemption can be used simultaneously.6 This issue is
relevant because if the RCRA preempts the state secrets privilege,
then no discovery material would have been barred in Frost's
appeal.66 The court resolved this issue by stating that in such a
situation, "'statutes which invade the common law... are to be read
with a presumption favoring the retention of long-established and
familiar principles, except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is
evident,' '67  Therefore, the statutory purpose of the RCRA's
presidential exemption may serve to allow protection of state secrets
because "[a]t times the purposes of the privilege and the exemption
may overlap, 68 even though the state secrets privilege and the
presidential exemption are intended to serve different purposes.69
As the Air Force had not received an exemption from the
RCRA's requirements for numerous years preceding the presidential
exemption,70 they presumably could only rely upon the state secrets
privilege to protect the environmental data for that un-exempted time
period. Nonetheless, the court declined "Kasza's invitation to
remand for the district court to determine the status of regulatory
information for prior, unexempted years."' The court reasoned that
since "[it] ha[d] already concluded that 'remedial' relief of the sort
requested is moot, remand would be pointless."72
V. THE THEORIES AT WORK
The court dealt with the Frost appeal by first discussing the




United States v. Nixon, 418 US. 683 (1974).
65Kasza, 133 F.3d at 167-68.66
1d. at 1165.
Old. (quoting United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993) (quoting Isbrandtsen
Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952))).
68
Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1168.69
id. at 1167.
7°Presidential Determination No. 95-45, 60 Fed. Reg. 52, 823 (Oct. 10, 1995).
71




for waste disposal standards in 42 U.S.C. §6961. 73 The court noted
that the two privileges existed for different reasons. The states secret
privilege is an evidentiary privilege that allows the government to
protect classified information during litigation. The presidential
exemption exists to permit the President to exempt federal facilities
from compliance with the RCRA if he believes it is in the best
interests of the United States to do so.74 As these privileges have
different purposes, and are not in conflict with or exclusive of one
another, the court saw no issues of preemption, and thus, no
conflict.75 Interestingly, the court offered scenarios in which the state
secrets privilege and the RCRA exemption would not co-exist, but
indicated that the result would likely be the same that the case would
be dismissed.
[I]f a facility has been exempted... a citizen's suit
could question whether the exemption was in the
paramount interest of the United States, to which the
exemption itself would not apply but to which the
state secrets privilege might. Likewise, if a facility
hasn't been exempted, but the suit could otherwise
go forward based on publicly available inventory and
inspection reports and testimony, it might still be the
case that disclosure of discrete items of relevant
information would affect the national interest.76
However, the court's discussion of the manner in which the
government asserted the state secrets privilege was not handled as
deftly. The main requirement of the state secrets privilege is
straightforward: a formal claim of privilege by the head of the
department that has control over the matter must exist. In this
instance, the Secretary of the Air Force properly made such a
declaration. 77 The court upheld the use of classified and unclassified
materials made available to the lower court as a proper invocation of
the state secrets privilege.78 However, it seems that the court did not
reasonably consider the actual content of the materials with which
Frost was concerned.
By applying the mosaic theory, the Air Force was able to
deny the existence of any item requested by Frost, regardless of the






77K za, 133 F.3d at 1167.7
'Id. at 169.
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household paint, car batteries, and jet fuel were deemed "top
secret."79 This seems to blatantly ignore the Reynolds requirement of
disentangling the sensitive from the non-sensitive. 0
The Secretary of the Air Force commented on the mosaic
theory and why such precautions are taken: "Collection of
information regarding the air, water, and soil is a classic foreign
intelligence practice because analysis of these samples can result in
identification of military operations and capabilities[.]" 8' While there
is no reason to dispute the accuracy of the Secretary's statement, it
seems that the mosaic theory can be expanded to cover any possible
item under its rubric. "Acknowledging that a large military base has
trichloroethylene is like saying that a cleaning crew has ammonia. It
would hardly be cause for celebration in the Russian intelligence
services. ' 2  Nonetheless, the court found that the state secrets
privilege and the use of the mosaic theory were valid.8 3 Moreover,
the court added the refrain from the Totten doctrine that any further
action by Frost would be barred because the subject matter of the
action is a state secret and "public policy forbids the maintenance of
any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would inevitably lead
to the disclosure of matters which the law itself regards as
confidential, and respecting which it will not allow the confidence to
be violated., 84 The court chose not to discuss exactly which "public
policy"85 it believed was at work; assumedly the policy was a vague
and elusive implication related to national security. The court merely
indicated that it accepted the district court's determination that the
action be dismissed as "further proceeding in this matter would
jeopardize national security,"86 notwithstanding the fact that the only
evidence considered by the district court was Secretary Widnall's
assertion of the state secrets privilege.
8 7
The Kasza appeal focused its attention on whether all of the
claims presented were moot. The court determined they were moot
because of the procurement of the presidential exemption, 8  In
addition to the denied requests for injunctive and declaratory relief,
Kasza also requested public disclosure of the reports at issue.89 These
7'60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, March 17, 1996).
80
d.
8Jacobstein, supra note 1I, at A].
2
d. at Al.
13See Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1159.
4







disclosure requirements, as stated under RCRA § 3007(c) 90 and
3016(a),9' were indeed violated, as noted by the district court.92
Therefore, the EPA "obtained a Presidential exemption under RCRA
§ 6001(a). 93  This presidential exemption,94 however, was not
entirely sweeping in its breadth. The exemption only applied to
RCRA requirements that "would require the disclosure of classified
information concerning that operating location to any unauthorized
person."95 Seemingly, this would require non-classified information
to be given to the appropriate agency-the EPA-as required by
RCRA because "[a]s a practical matter, the President's exemption
relates in this case to RCRA's public disclosure requirement. 96
Kasza also argued that this exemption did not apply to past
requirements of disclosure of information to the EPA. The court
accepted this argument, stating "[s]o far as [it could] tell, [the
President] hasn't tried to do so."' The court placed the capstone on
this litigation when it concluded that "remedial relief of the sort
requested is moot" and that a remand to determine "the status of
regulatory information for prior, unexempted years" would be
"pointless," even though such a determination was the goal of the
entire legal action.98
VI. IMPLICATIONS
Setting aside the multitude of environmental harms that could
arise from un-checked waste disposal methods, the human damages
that have already occurred will likely continue to develop for the
unnamed plaintiffs in both cases. 99 Another ramification of the Kasza
decision is that the Air Force does not have to comment on any of the
allegations made by workers at the Groom Lake location that were
not protected by the RCRA exemption because of the state secrets
privilege.'00 Seemingly, as far as the Air Force is concerned, the
Groom Lake base and all activities there simply did not exist. But to
Kasza's widow:




Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1173.
931d.
"Presidential Determination No. 95-45,60 Fed. Reg. 52,823 (Oct. 10, 1995).
931d.
"Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1173.
"Id. at 1174.
981d.
"See Leiby, supra note 9, at FI.
"'OSee Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1170.
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If, officially, Wally Kasza didn't work at Area 51 for
seven years, then, officially, his death had nothing to
do with his job. He didn't wake up with bloody
pajamas from the fish scales, didn't hack his lungs
out in the middle of the night kneeling next to the
bed. Didn't get cancer. Didn't suffer so horribly that
his son wanted to smother him with a pillow to end it
all.1 1
Obviously, Kasza's and Frost's widows know that their husbands are
indeed dead, and other workers at the Groom Lake location will
likely suffer similar fates.' 
02
The exemption President Clinton issued was subsequently re-
issued each year while he was in office." 3 President Bush also issued
an exemption during his first year in office.' 0 4 With this in mind, it
seems that these exemptions will continue to be issued from the
White House, enabling the Air Force to avoid compliance with the
RCRA disclosure requirements. If the Air Force does not have to
comply with the RCRA disclosure requirements, then there is no
guarantee that the disposal methods for waste materials will improve
because disclosure of environmental compliance will not occur
publicly, and the EPA is not allowed to discuss the contents of the
inventory and inspection claims for-not surprisingly-reasons of
national security.'0 5 Coupling this with the fact that there is still no
check on the Air Force's ability to continue disposing of waste in
whatever manner it sees fit, it is difficult to accept the protestations of
the Air Force that "[w]e take our responsibility concerning protection
of the environment seriously.., protecting the environment and
national security are not incompatible."' 6  If the Air Force's
assertions of environmental goodwill are not accepted, the decision
by the Kasza court indicates that there remains little recourse. 10 7 The
only other way to alter the practice of RCRA exemptions would be
through political pressure, either upon Congress to change the scope
of the presidential exemption, or upon the President himself.
The decisions of the Kasza court continue the trend of
increasing reliance on the Totten doctrine and the state secrets
'0°Leiby, supra note 9, at FI.
'02See id.
'03Presidential Determination No. 2000-30 (September 19, 2000); Presidential
Determination No. 99-37 (September 20, 1999); Presidential Determination No.98-36
(September 25, 1998); Presidential Determination No. 97.35 (September 26, 1997); Presidential
Determination No, 96-54 (September 28, 1996).
'04Presidential Determination No. 2001-27 (September 18, 2001).
'0°Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1174.
1'6Jacobs, supra note 11, at AI.
' SeeKasza, 133 F.3d at 1170.
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privilege. "The state secrets privilege was invoked only five times
between 1951 and 1970 [and] it has been invoked more than fifty
times since 1971. ' °8 And "[w]hile the courts invoked the Totten
doctrine only six times between 1875 and 1951, since 1951 it has
been cited more than sixty-five times."' 09 In the instant case, it is
interesting to note that the court chose not to review the materials that
comprised the "mosaic," which the Air Force claimed would expose
state secrets at the district or appellate level." 10 Instead, the court did
not fulfill "their constitutionally required mission - adequate
review,""' and relied solely upon the assertions made by the Air
Force. By doing so, the Kasza court chose to ignore the crimes
perpetrated against the environment as well as the crimes against the
individuals involved, simply in the name of secrecy. But, the
"secrets" that the Kasza litigants needed in order to move their case
forward were already known and of little value. 12 It seems the only
thing really protected by the Kasza decision was the government's
ability to keep secrets. The end result will be a "broadening of a
principle that could block access to a whole range of information that
should be available to the public."" 3
'"j. Steven Gardner, The State Secret Privilege Invoked in Civil Litigation: A
Proposal for Statutory Relief, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 567, 584-85 (1994).
'"Flynn, supra note 40, at 793.
"'SeeKasza, 133 F.3d at 1159.
1 
Flynn, supra note 40, at 806.
"
2
See Jacobs, supra note 11, at Al.
1131d-
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